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Summary findings
'-he'performance  of the East Asian transition economies  China experienced an extended transition process; the
in export and income growth has been strikingly better  transition was much shorter in other East Asian
than that of countries in Eastern Europe and the former  transition economies-especially  Cambodia.
Soviet Union. The East Asian economies have achieved  Several of the East Asian transition economies used
remarkably high growth rates in outputs and exports  accession to a regional arrangement as part of their
without the often large declines in output and exports  reform strategy. China focused mainly on unilateral
observed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  reforms and, more recently, reforms associated with its
East Asian reformers have successfully  made many of  accession to the World Trade  Organization.
the parallel changes needed in both domestic and trade  Most have made extensive use of policies to attract
;olicies to secure export and income growth. (It makes  foreign investment and to mitigate the burden of
no sense, for example, to introduce the trade policy  protection on manufacturing exporters.
.nstruments of a market economy when the domestic  Most of the remaining trade policy problems, although
zconomy is still based on central planning.)  difficult, appear to be problems more of development
But there has been no single magic formula for their  than of transition.
success. Martin discusses what each of the economies
(Cambodia, China, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
and Vietnam) has done.
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in the East Asian transition economies.Trade Policy Reform in the East Asian Transition Economies
Reform of the trading system has been central to the success or failure of reforms
in the transition economies of Europe and Asia. In highly successful transition economies
such as China and Poland, both trade and output have grown rapidly, with no sustained
loss of output during the transition. By contrast, many of the transition economies that
suffered greater difficulties during the process have experienced substantial declines in
both trade and output.
There are two fundamental reasons for the observed link between trade and
overall economic  performance. The first is that both depend on the policies and
institutions in place in the transition country, and its major trading partners. The second is
that increased openness to the world appears to have a strong impact on rates of
economic growth (Frankel and Romer 1999).  The first source of the observed correlation
highlights the importance of reforming trade policy as part of a more comprehensive
package of reforms aimed at achieving economic development.  The second highlights the
importance of reforming trade policies if the reforms are to succeed in raising living
standards and alleviating  poverty.
Successful reform of the trade regime is difficult,  both for technical reasons, and
because of the strong political pressures in this sector in all countries. The major
technical difficulties in reforming the trading system arise from the need to make these
reforms in parallel with reforms in domestic economic  policies. It does not make sense,
for example, to introduce the trade policy instruments of a market economy in an
economy that is still based on a pure planning system. A market-oriented economy relies
on price signals to allocate resources, and these price signals are absent, or irrelevant to
behavior, in a planned economy. The political difficulties in reforming the trade regime
arise in all economies, but particularly in economies, such as most early transition
economies, where there is heavy reliance on quantitative controls. These quantitative
controls create scarcity rents and the beneficiaries of these rents are frequently strong
opponents of further reforms.While reform is difficult, a great deal can be learned from the experience of those
economies which have already made substantial progress with the transition. As we will
see, this experience has been extremely diverse. This diversity of experience provides
two important lessons. One lesson is that there is no single path to reform. Each country
must choose its own path, depending upon its own particular circumstances and
constraints. Another is that the path chosen needs to be coherent, and successful in
reducing or removing serious distortions or the reform process will not be successful.
While mechanisms such as two-tier pricing schemes may play a role in the transition
process, they are likely to create considerable  problems of corruption and rent-seeking if
left in place too long, and should be phased out as quickly as possible.
Some simple numbers on economic  performance are examined early in this paper
and reveal vastly higher rates of growth in exports and in output in East Asia than in the
countries of the former Soviet Union. Explaining this vastly better performance requires
examination, not just of trade policy, but of the whole gamut of reforms. However, trade
policy reform is likely to be a key element of the picture, and this paper focuses on the
reforms made in some of the key East Asian transition economies.
The next section of this paper examines the rationale and need for trade policy
reform as part of the transition process. Then, we turn to an examination of the
experiences of some of the East Asian transition economies, and comparisons with the
experience of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. After this, we examine the
potential role of regional trade agreements and of WTO accession in deepening trade
reforms once the transition process is under way. Finally, we consider some lessons for
countries beginning the transition process.
The Need for an Open Trade Regime
An open trade regime has at least four major advantages over a closed-economy
approach to economic development. These advantages are:
21.  The comparative-static  benefits from trade
2.  The ability of sectors with relatively high productivity to grow far
beyond demand in the country itself
3.  Dynamic welfare gains arising from continuing rises in productivity
4.  Reductions in the incentives  for unproductive activities and corruption
associated with trade barriers
The comparative-static  benefits from trade are the ones most frequently discussed
in textbooks in international  trade. Perhaps the most fundamental insight of this literature
(see, for example, Sodersten and Reed 1994)  is that the gains from trade depend only on a
country having a comparative advantage in the production of a good. This means that
even a very poor country can gain from trading with other countries. It is simply not the
case that a country with poor technology will be unable to compete in the world market'.
The comparative-static  welfare gains from beginning to open up an economy that is
closed to participation in world trade are likely to be very large because of the substantial
differences in the relative costs of producing goods domestically  relative to the costs in
other countries. As the country opens up more and more, these welfare gains decline as
the differences in cost become smaller.
The second advantage arises because it is difficult to master the technology of
production in a new product line. Once these investments  in improving technology have
been made, as they have been in the clothing sectors of all of the East Asian transition
economies, there are potentially very large gains from being able to expand production in
high-productivity  sectors. In a closed economy, this process of growth is constrained by
the size of the domestic market, which is an extremely serious constraint in a small and
poor economy. In an open economy, an efficient and expanding industry has the entire
world market available to it. Further, in an open, multi-sector economy, it is possible to
have extremely  high levels of capital accumulation,  such as those observed in East Asia,
without depressing the return on capital-- as the economy becomes better endowed with
Improving the technology is important, because this will raise incomes.
3capital, it shifts into more capital-intensive  sectors as suggested by the Rybczynski
theorem.
The third advantage is related to the second and, in fact, Bernard and Jensen's
results (1999) suggest that most of the productivity gains associated with exporting may
be derived from this source. However, there are many other potential sources of
productivity gain, including greater ability to upgrade both product and process
technology by imitating the approaches used in more advanced trading partners. While
much remains unknown about the process by which countries' productivity grows with
trade (Edwards 1998) and Dani Ben-David (1996) demonstrate that the ability of poor
countries to catch up to the technological leaders is strongly related to the extent to which
they are trade partners. Lucas (1988) highlights the way in which these benefits can
compound, utterly transforming poor societies within the space of a generation.
The fourth advantage arises from the problems widely observed in developing
countries using strong trade barriers, and particularly quantitative barriers, to restrict or
eliminate trade. Strong trade barriers can lead to very large distortions, and to the waste
of a great deal of resources on pursuing these rents, either legally or illegally (Krueger
1984).  The availability of large gains from illegal activity tends to divert resources from
productive activities, and to lead to corruption in the administrative and enforcement
services whose performance is now recognized as central to successful development
(World Bank 1999a).
It is frequently argued that trade policy should have many objectives other than
efficiently linking domestic to world markets. These objectives  typically include: revenue
raising; the protection of infant industries; and environmental and social goals. In most
cases, these objectives are likely to be more successfully addressed through instruments
better targeted to them.
While tariffs are frequently an important source of revenue in poor countries, it is
important to do as much as possible to reduce countries' dependence on these revenues. It
4is frequently argued that collecting revenues from customs duties at the border is easier
and less expensive to than taxing production or consumption.  However, this will typically
not be the case for the high-revenue items such as alcohol, tobacco and petroleum
products, for which domestic production is likely to be very concentrated and easy to tax.
Transition economies such as Cambodia have also been able to reduce their reliance on
customs duties by introducing modified Value Added Taxes (VATs) on a range of
commodities.
The infant industry argument is very old, but has typically been found to be
without  justification. The basic argument is that there is some market failure, such as an
inadequate capital market, a lack of skilled workers, or a need to learn by doing, and that
protection is essential for production to get under way. From an economic point of view,
it is clear that the best approach to dealing with any of these problems is with a policy
response that deals with the underlying problem. From a policy perspective, such "infant"
industries have rarely "grown-up", and frequently continue to seek protection well into
advanced old-age 2.
The use of trade measures for environmental and social goals should also be
approached with caution. Most environmental  problems are related not to trade, but to
either a production process or the level of consumption.  Trade policies measures are
inferior to environmental  policy measures that can directly  attack the environmental
problem (Martin 1999). Proposals to use trade measures to improve labor standards are
subject to the same criticism.
It is very common for trade regimes to include some degree of tariff escalation,
where tariffs are low on raw materials, higher on intermediate  products, and higher again
on final goods. Such escalation is typically seen as harmless,  or even desirable. However,
such a system can easily create serious economic distortions.  The net impact on
producers in a particular sector will include the negative impact of protection on inputs,
and the positive impact of protection on outputs, the combined effect of which is
2 Industries such as steel and clothing in the industrial countries of today provide good examples.
5measured using the Effective Rate of Protection (Corden 1997) Clearly, exporters will
suffer from such a system because they receive no protection on their output, and must
pay the costs of tariffs on their inputs. By contrast, producers for whom protected inputs
are a minor source of production, and for whom value added is a small share of output
value, may receive very large windfall gains.
For all of the reasons outlined above, most economists strongly favor a trade
regime using price-based trade measures such as tariffs that are as low and uniform as
possible. Getting to such a trade regime from the trade policies prevailing under a
planned economic system involves many inter-related steps, and the experience of earlier
transition economies is a potentially very useful guide for future reforms. In the next
section, we therefore review the approaches followed by several East Asian transition
econormies.
Reform Experience  in East Asian  Transition Economies
Under a classical planned-economy  trade regime, trade in each product is
monopolized by a foreign trade corporation. Policy measures such as tariffs, quotas,
licenses, and exchange rates play a relatively minor role, since most decisions about the
level and composition of exports and imports are made through the planning system.
Reform of such a system to a more market oriented trading system requires a number of
steps, such as:
1.  Opening up the trade system to competing traders
2.  Developing indirect policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas and moving
progressively to price-based measures
3.  Removing exchange rate distortions,
4.  The possible introduction of measures to reduce the impact of continuing
distortions.
These trade reforms must take place in the context of fundamental reforms in
the domestic economy. In particular, it is necessary that property rights be defined in a
6manner that provides sufficient autonomy for managers to respond to market signals
rather than, or in addition to, planning mandates. Further, mechanisms must be devised to
allow market prices to exist, and to link with world prices through the trade regime.
These adjustments can potentially be made all at once, or they can be phased in.
Either approach can work quite well. The transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe followed the former approach, and were rapidly integrated into the world trading
system (Michalopoulos 1999).  The Royal Government  of Cambodia also followed a
relatively rapid, and relatively successful, approach to reform. A phased approach has
been used, with great success, in China, whose growth in trade and output during the
reforrn era has been extremely rapid. A gradual approach is not without its dangers,
however, as is clear from the experience of Russia and some other members of the
Former Soviet Union, where the momentum  for reform appears to have stalled, with trade
and output declining and then, at best, stagnating for an extended period (Michalopoulos
1999).
The study of eight countries created from the Former Soviet Union reported in
Michalopoulos and Tarr (1996) provides an important  benchmark for the East Asian
transition economies. In this study, the Baltic countries, the fastest reformers, had the best
trade performance.  The moderate reformers such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and
Russia had made significant policy reforms by the mid 1990s,  but had not yet arrested the
decline in output and trade. The slowest reformers, such as Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus
and Georgia,  had by far the worst performance.
While any such comparisons  are made difficult by data limitations, it seems
worthwhile  to attempt a simple comparison of the performance  of the East Asian
transition economies with some of those in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.
To this end, growth rates of exports and of GDP for selected countries are presented in
Table 1.
7Table 1. Growth rates of exports and of GDP in selected transition economies, 1990-99
Exports  GDP
Belarus  -2.6  -4.3
Cambodia  20.2  4.8
China  17.0  10.7
Lao  PDR  21.1  6.4
Latvia  -7.1  -4.8
Mongolia  4.4  0.7
Myanmar  15.4  6.3
Poland  10.6  4.7
Romania  8.7  -1.2
Russian  Federation  0.6  -6.1
Ukraine  -1.8  -10.8
Uzbekistan  -9.6  -2.0
Vietnam  28.3  8.1
Average  East  Asian  Transition  Economies  18.2  6.1
Ave  EA Transition  (excl  Mongolia)  21.6  7.5
Source:  World  Development  Indicators.  Note:  Growth  rates  are  exponential.  Period  1990-
1999  or nearest  available.  Exports  generally  BOP  basis,  in current  US dollars.  GDP  growth
in constant  local currency.
From the table, it is clear that the performance of most of the East Asian transition
economies has been very strong over the periods during the 1990s for which comparable
data are available. The average export growth rate of the East Asian transition economies
was 22 percent. Linked with this was an extremely strong growth average GDP growth
rate of 7.5 percent. In none of the East Asian economies was there anything resembling
the sustained and deep output contractions  that have been experienced in the Former
Soviet Union. Of the East Asian transition economies, only Mongolia had an anemic
growth rate, and even here the average economic growth rate over the period was still
slightly positive, at 0.7 percent per year. In the remainder of this paper, we examine the
trade reforms that were undertaken in several of the reforming East Asian economies, to
provide a basis for understanding whether trade policy reforms might have contributed to
this outcome.
8Trade Reform experience in China
China's reform experience is important since it was the first of the East Asian
transition economies to begin reforms, is well documented, and has provided a model for
other transition economies. To understand the reform experience in China, it is useful to
review the features of the pre-reform trade regime. After examining this, we turn to the
process by which it was reformed.
The Pre-Reform Chinese Trade Regime
The pre-reform Chinese trade regime was dominated  by between 10 and 16
Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) with effective monopolies  in the import and export of
their specified ranges of products (Lardy 1991). Planned import volumes were
determined  by the projected difference between domestic demand and supply for
particular goods, with export levels being determined  by the planners at levels necessary
to finance planned imports.
Under the pre-reform Chinese system, commodity prices were set without regard
to scarcity or cost, and were intended to serve only an accounting  function. Further, the
exchange rate was very substantially overvalued, creating a general disincentive to export
and an artificial incentive to import. Many producer goods had low prices that would
have made exports artificially profitable and made necessary imports of some needed
goods unprofitable. An explicit objective of the Foreign Trade Corporations was to
create an air-lock between producers and foreign markets that would vitiate the artificial
incentives created by the pricing system  3.
Conventional  trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas and licenses had a
very limited role. Price-based measures such as tariffs were obviously unimportant since
the planning system was based on quantity decisions rather than behavioral responses to
3 Or, in the original conception, to insulate the economy from the harmful irrationalities of world market
prices (World Bank 1988).
9prices. There was little need for quotas or licenses since the quantities to be imported
could be controlled by the relevant monopoly trading corporations. As Lardy (1991)
notes, the introduction of licensing actually reflected a liberalization of China's trade
regime.
A major World Bank study (1988) of China's foreign trade regime highlighted the
many disadvantages and costs of China's pre-reform  trade regime, many of the features
of which were still present in the mid 1980s. The air-lock between China and the world
market was a particular focus of concern because of the resulting lack of information
about the needs of export markets, and a lack of competition from imports, both of which
generated substantial inefficiencies.  The rigid foreign exchange system was another
major cause for concern because it created a need for inefficient, bureaucratic allocation
of foreign exchange.
Trade Policy Reform in China
Reform of China's trade regime had three major dimensions: increasing the
number and type of enterprises eligible to trade in particular commodities; developing the
indirect trade policy instruments that were absent or unimportant under the planning
system; reducing and ultimately removing the exchange rate distortion. These reforms
were inextricably linked to price and enterprise reform within the economy that allowed
prices to play a role in guiding resource allocation, and enterprises to respond to these
price signals. These reforms of the trading system were inextricably linked with reform of
the enterprise sector to replace central planning of outputs with indirect regulation
through market-determined prices. These reforms were undertaken incrementally, with
feedback from each reform taken into account in designing the next stage of the reform--
an approach colorfully described as "crossing the river by feeling the stones" -- rather
than proceeding according to a comprehensive  overall plan for reform.
A central feature of the reforms was the decentralization  of foreign trade rights
beyond the original handful of centrally controlled foreign trade corporations. This was
10not done according to the usual negative list approach whereby enterprise can trade in
any good except those subject to restricted trading rights. Rather, a combination of a
negative list for commodities and a positive list for trading firms was introduced. A
negative list approach is used to reserve a list of commodities for trading by specified
enterprises. Firms wishing to trade in other products are required to be on a positive list
of firms with trading rights for those particular goods. The reform process gradually
increased both the number of firms allowed to trade, and the number of different types of
firms eligible for trading rights.
The number of FTCs with trading rights was progressively  expanded, with trading
rights provided to branches of the FTCs controlled by the central government, and to
those controlled  by regions and localities. Since 1984, these trading enterprises have been
legally independent  economic entities (Kueh 1987) and state owned trading enterprises of
this type now appear to operate very strongly along commercial  lines (Rozelle et al
1996).  Joint ventures between domestic and foreign firms, and firms located in the
special economic zones were also allowed the right to trade their own products relatively
early during the reform process. At a later stage, large producing firms began to gain
direct foreign trade rights. The process of decentralizing  trade was gradual, but the trend
was very consistent, with commodities being progressively  removed from export and
import planning controls. Indeed, by 1992, these plans covered only a small share of
products (World Bank 1994; Yin 1996, plO3) and they have since been abolished.
An important feature of the reforms was the introduction  of special arrangements
for processing trade. The distortions created by tariffs and nontariff barriers in the early
phase of reform would have precluded large-scale production of manufactures for export.
In response to this problem, imports of intermediate inputs for use in the production of
exports were almost completely liberalized, as were capital goods inputs for use in joint
ventures with foreign enterprises. Initially, this favorable treatment was extended only to
enterprises operating in free trade zones, but coverage of these arrangements was quite
rapidly extended. This category of imports came to represent a very large share of total
imports, accounting for almost half of total imports by 1996.
11Import and export licensing measures were introduced in 1980 to replace the
controls imposed under the previous trade monopoly (Lardy 1991). The coverage of
licensing was initially small, but increased sharply as more and more trade was removed
from the planning process. Lardy (1991, p 44) notes that licensing covered two thirds of
China's imports in 1988. Since then, the coverage of licensing has fallen dramatically.
An important transitional device used to reduce, and ultimately remove, the
distortions in both commodity prices and exchange rates was the multi-tier pricing
system. Under the two-tier pricing system for commodities, the plan price continued to
operate for the quantity of the commodity  that producers were contracted to supply.
However, to stimulate output, producers were allowed to supply additional output at a
secondary market price. When plan prices are below market prices, this system can, in
the short-run, allow revenue to be generated in a non-distorting manner (Sicular 1988;
Byrd 1989). The revenues raised were frequently redistributed to consumers within the
same market. This was the case for grains, where consumers were supplied with fixed
rations of grain at below-market prices.
A two tier system for foreign exchange involved an overvalued official exchange
rate and a higher secondary-market  rate. This distorted trade by discouraging both
exports and imports (see Martin 1993, World Bank 1994). Over time, the share of foreign
exchange receipts that exporters could retain for sale on the secondary market was raised,
lowering the gap between the rates received by exporters and paid by importers, and
reducing the extent of the distortion. The exchange rate was unified in 1994, removing
this distortion.
These two-tier systems were feasible in China because of its ability to compel
state-owned enterprises and farming households to continue to delivering outputs at
below-market  prices. However, the large discrepancies  between official and market
prices created enormous incentives for corruption that would, if continued, have
jeopardized the reform process. These incentives for corruption were reduced by
12relatively rapid increases in plan prices, reducing the gap between them and market
prices.
The importance of market prices relative to plan prices increased very rapidly as
the reforms progressed. The share of retail commodities sold at fixed prices declined
from 97 percent in 1978 to only 5 percent in 1993. Even for agricultural goods, where
state pricing of  some basic commodities such as grains remains important, only  10
percent of total sales were at state fixed prices in 1993. However, in a significant reversal
of the trend towards liberalization, the share of goods subject to state pricing increased
substantially between 1993 and 1995, although this share remained much lower than it
had been prior to the early 1990s.
Types and Numbers of Trading Firms
The positive-list system for allocating trading rights in China would potentially
allow direct control of imports if the number of trading enterprises were small, and if
these enterprises  were subject to a single supervisory  body. However, The Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC)  reported that roughly 9000
Foreign Trade Corporations were active with very broad trading rights (MOFrEC
personal communication,  June 1999). Of these around 100 are owned by the central
government, and the remainder are owned by provincial and local governments. In
addition to these Foreign Trade Corporations,  there is a number of other types of firms
with trading rights, including joint ventures with foreign firms, foreign firms operating in
China, and a small number of private and collective  firms.
Naughton (1996) notes that State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) accounted for a
relatively large share of the trade subject to ordinary customs duties, as distinct from
preferential regimes such as imports for processing). In 1996, ordinary customs trade
accounted for only 28 percent of imports (Economic  Information and Agency 1997), and
SOEs of one form or another accounted for 79 percent of this trade. However, these
SOEs include a very wide range of firm types, including: state trading monopolies, FTCs
13administered by the central government, FTCs administered  by provinces and
municipalities, SOEs with direct trading rights for their own products, and wholesale and
retail trading firms. Except for those cases where there are restrictions on trading rights,
the very large numbers of potential importers within and outside the ranks of the SOEs
seem likely to create a relatively competitive  trading environment. Further, China's
accession to the WTO will remove the restrictions on trade, distribution and retail
activities.
Despite the large number of trading firms overall, there are two broad groups of
commodities for which the number of firms entitled to engage in trade is tightly
restricted. One of these groups is subject to state trading, while the other is subject to
designated trading. The state trading system applies to a relatively small number of
commodities that are believed to be of particular importance  for the peoples' livelihood
and national economic development-many  of these commodities are either agricultural
products, or agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. The system of designated trading
applies to a range of other important commodities. The 70 tariff lines subject to state
trading on the import side are drawn from the commodity groups set out in Table 2, as are
the 115 tariff lines covered by state trading on the export side. The 229 tariff lines subject
to designated trading are primarily importables.
Table  2.. Products  covered  by state  trading  and  designated  trading.
Imports  Exports
State trading  Grain, vegetable oils, sugar,  Tea, maize, soybeans, tungsten and
tobacco, crude oil, refined oil,  products, coal, crude oil, refined oil,
chemical fertilizer, cotton  silk, unbleached silk, cotton and
I products, antimony
Designated trading  Rubber, timber, plywood, wool,  Rubber, timber, plywood, wool,
Iacrylics, steel and products  acrylics, steel and products
Source: Government of China, 2000.
The products subject to state trading are typically handled by one or a few foreign
trade corporations, making direct control of the quantities imported and exported
relatively practical. The system of coordination and control used for major state-traded
commodities such as grains and fertilizer appears to follow the basic lines used under the
14traditional planning system. Estimates of the gap between supply and demand are made
up to 18 months in advance of the actual trade taking place, and there appears to be
considerable  reluctance to adjust the quantity targets in responses to developments  such
as unanticipated shocks to domestic supply or demand. Recent empirical research
concludes that, rather than helping to stabilize domestic grain prices, this inflexible
system contributes substantially  to the volatility of domestic grain prices  (World  Bank
1997a). Carter, Chen and Rozelle (1998) identified many of the classic features of the
traditional monopoly trading system in the grain trade-an  "airlock" between buyers and
suppliers; poor quality matching; unpredictable  timing of deliveries. In addition, they
found many of the features of poorly operating markets, particularly concerns that traders
are using their superior information to take advantage of buyers in China.
Nontariff barriers
The coverage of state trading and designated trading is shown, together with other
nontariff barriers affecting China's import trade, in Table 3. From the table, it appears
that state trading and designated trading accounted  for 11 and 7 percent respectively of
total imports, and made up over half of the total trade coverage of nontariff barriers in
China. Clearly, the regime used for state trading and designated trading is an important
special feature of the Chinese trade regime, but very much a rninority part of the overall
system, rather than the dominant part. The heavy reliance on state trading for major
agricultural trade has, however, raised concerns about the transparency of China's
agricultural trade regime (see Dixit and Josling 1997).
The average protective impact of the complete set of nontariff barriers presented
in Table 3 was estimated to be equivalent to a 9.3 percent ad valorem tariff (World Bank
1997b). This evaluation was undertaken using information  on the tariff equivalents of
these nontariff barriers obtained from the Unirule Institute study prepared for the Institute
of International Economics (Zhang, Zhang and Wan 1998) and from price comparisons
drawn from the International Comparisons  Project. Products imported under the State
Trading categories accounted  for only 0.7 percentage points of this total protection. On
this basis, it appears that state trading of imports, the only form of nontariff barrier that
15will remain when China imnplements  its WTO accession arrangements, has been a very
minor restriction on trade in the recent past.
Table  3. Share  of imports  covered  by NTBs in 1996,  using 1992  trade  weights.
State  Desig.  Lond  Licenses Quota  Tend.  All
Rice  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0
Wheat  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0
Coarse  grains  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Nongrain  crops  50.0  22.9  0.0  72.9  72.9  0.0  72.9
Livestock  0.0  72.7  0.0  72.7  72.7  0.0  72.7
Meat  and milk  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other  food  products  37.2  0.0  0.0  32.9  31.7  0.0  38.4
Natural  resources  46.6  12.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  59.5
Textiles  0.3  5.7  0.0  12.7  12.7  0.0  12.7
Wearing  apparel  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Light  manufactures  0.0  9.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.3
Transport  equipment  0.0  0.0  0.0  35.8  35.8  6.6  42.4
Machinery  and  equipment  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.2  9.2  20.4  26.8
Basic  heavy  manufactures  18.7  16.2  0.3  23.5  22.7  0.0  37.7
Services  0.0  0.0  I  0.0  I  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
TOTAL  11.0  7.3  0.1  18.5  16.3  7.4  32.5
The  measures  listed  include  state  trading,  designated  trading,  the London  Convention,
import  licenses,  import  quotas,  and  price  tendering.  Source:  World  Bank  1997b
Tariff barriers in China
The pace of tariff reform begun in the early 1990s  has been continued in recent
years. A significant tariff reform was implemented  in October 1997, reducing average
tariffs significantly below 20 percent, while a more limited reform in January 1999
focussed on timber products. Some basic data on trends in average tariff rates are given in
Table 4, where simple averages, as well as trade-weighted averages are reported for
broad groups of merchandise trade.
In recent years, the reform process in China's trade policy has been heavily
influenced by the ongoing negotiations  for WTO accession (Ianchovichina, Martin and
Fukase 2000). While the final agreement is not yet fully known, it is clear that it will
involve further reductions in tariff rates, to a simple average of around 9 percent in
manufactures,  and around 15 percent in agriculture. All nontariff barriers other than state
16trading are to be abolished. All tariffs will be subject to WTO tariff bindings that will
require tariff reductions. China is also making substantial commitments to open up its
trade in services, and will be committing itself to protecting Intellectual Property Rights
at the standards specified in the WTO agreement on Trade-Related  Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). Most of the adjustments required by China's accession will be made by
China itself, but the agreement will lead to the phasing out of quotas against China's
exports of textiles and apparel, and will provide China with protection against many types
of unilateral action by its trading partners.
Table 4. Changes in average tariff rates in China
All merchandise  Primary products  Manufactures
Simple  Weighted  Simple  Weighted  Simple  Weighted
1992  42.9  40.6  36.2  22.3  44.9  46.5
1993  39.9  38.4  33.3  20.9  41.8  44.0
1994  36.3  35.5  32.1  19.6  37.6  40.6
1996  23.6  22.6  25.4  20.0  23.1  23.2
1997  17.6  18.2  17.9  20.0  17.5  17.8
1998  1  17.5  18.7  17.9  20.0  17.4  18.5
Source:  World  Bank  (1999,  p340)
Trade Reform  in Vietnam 4
The reform era of doi moi in Vietnam began in 1986, eight years after the
commencement  of comprehensive  reforms in China. Key events in trade policy and
related areas are given in Table 5.
From the table, it is clear that reform in Vietnam proceeded very rapidly in
undertaking the multi-dimensional  reforms needed to move from a planned trade regime.
In 1988,  the crucial step of abolishing the central government's monopoly on trade was
taken, farming households were given land use rights, the customs tariff was introduced,
4 This section draws heavily on Fukase and Martin (2000).
17and the establishment of private enterprises was officially encouraged. Further major
reforms were introduced in 1989, when quotas were removed on all but a few export and
import commodities, the coverage and rates of export duties were reduced considerably,
the foreign exchange system was unified, and producers allowed to sell to any licensed
foreign trade company.
Table 5. Major changes in Vietnam's trade and related policies since the beginning of the
reform era
Year  Changes  in trade and exchange system  Other reforms
1986  Party congress declares beginning of doi  moi
1987  Law on foreign investment-introduction  of  Land Law establishes private use of
'open door' policy  allocated land in agriculture
Law on Foreign investment-introduction  of
'open door' policy
1988  Foreign exchange control decree liberalises  Cooperative method of agriculture
retention of foreign exchange.  production abandoned in favour of
households.
Devaluation of trade and invisible payments
exchange rates  Encouragement of private enterprises
becomes official policy
Introduction of a customs tariff
1989  Quotas removed on all but ten export and 14  Nearly all forms of direct subsidization  of
import commodities  production and price control removed
Export commodities subject to export duties
reduced from 30 to 12 and most rates reduced
Producers of exportables allowed to sell to
any appropriately licensed foreign trade
company
Foreign exchange rate system unified
All budgetary export subsidies  removed
1990  General export-import  companies required to  Law on Private Enterprises establishes legal
register with regulatory organization  for  establishment of sole proprietorships
individual commodities
Law on Companies establishes legal basis
for operation of independent enterprises
1991  Inputs used to produce exports exempted from
duty
Private companies allowed to directly engage
in international trade
1992  Foreign investment law amended to reduce  Individuals allowed property rights over
discrimination in favor of joint ventures  income producing asset personal property
against foreign owned enterprises
Pilot equitisation program for SOEs
_ _ _ _ _ ___  . introduced
18Year  Changes in trade and exchange system  Other reforms
1994  Vietnam gains GATT observer status
Introduction of interbank foreign exchange
market
Steps in process of licensing to engage in
international trade reduced from three to two
1995  Coverage of export quotas reduced to rice  New regulations on land limits nature of land
use rights.
Vietnam joins  ASEAN
1996  Maximum  tariff rate reduced to 80 per cent  Law on State Budget formalises budgetary
practice and defines revenue and expenditure
responsibilities  of different levels of
government
Law on Minerals lays out framework for
exploitation  of mineral resources
1997  Imports of sugar prohibited  Introduction of VAT in 1999
Temporary prohibitions imposed on imports  Law on Cooperatives  confirms continued
of wide range of consumer goods then lifted  government  support for cooperative  business
1998  Forward and swap foreign exchange  Taxpayer identification numbering system
transactions authorized  introduced
Highest tariff rate reduced to 60 per cent
Management of imports  of most consumer
goods shifted to tariffs rather than quotas or
licensing
Domestic enterprises authorized to directly
export production without an export/import
license
Amendment to import/export  tax law
introduces  3- schedule tariff, and provision for
antidumping  and countervailing  duty
Source: Based on Table 1.3  of CIE (1998).
The pace of reform remained rapid during the early 1990s. A legal basis for
independent  firms was introduced, private firms were allowed to enter foreign trade;
tariff exemptions were introduced for inputs used in the production of exports; the
coverage of nontariff barriers was reduced, and considerable  progress was made in
reforms for foreign investment; and the development of financial and legal institutions.
19During this period, the rates of growth of exports were particularly high 5. During the late
1990s,  progress was made in a number of areas, including reductions in maximum import
tariff rates, the implementation of tariff reductions associated with membership of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area. However, in a number of cases, the reform process appears to
have slowed or even been reversed. After 1997, the rate of growth of exports also
declined dramatically.
A significant  indication of a new approach to reform occurred in 2000, when
Vietnam and the United States agreed to a bilateral trade agreement that seems likely to
provide Vietnam with MFN access to the US market, and to commit Vietnam to
liberalization of its markets for goods, services and investment. Vietnam's offer on
merchandise trade is relatively modest, and seems likely to reduce its average import
tariff by only around 1 percent. The main gains to Vietnam on merchandise trade
liberalization will come from its increased access to the US market (see Fukase and
Martin forthcoming). However, its commitments on services are relatively deep and wide
ranging, and it has agreed to implement a relatively comprehensive agreement on
intellectual property rights. This agreement seems to be another important step in
deepening Vietnam's reforms, and helping pave the way for future accession to the
WTO.
Vietnam has the objective of converting itself into an industrial country by 2020,
and import substitution linked to state control and protection remains an influential idea.
Considerable attention has been paid to the development of the industrial base through a
combination  of export orientation and import substitution. Vietnam appears to be
targeting the development of a set of capital-intensive and so-called strategic industries
and using trade and investment policies to promote these industries. A problem with this
approach is that it has contributed to the emergence of a high and variable set of nominal
and effective rates of protection, and hence to considerable distortions.
5 Over the 1990 to 1996 period, the average compound growth rate of exports was 31 percent using World
Development Indicators data.
20Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection
Table 6 shows a summary of Vietnam's tariff protection. The first two columns
show the nominal rate of protection (NRP) whereas the second two show the effective
rate of protection (ERP). The simple average tariff rate is 15.6 percent and the trade-
weighted average is 19.0 percent. There is a general tendency for Vietnam's tariff
structure to be relatively low for capital goods and raw materials, and higher for finished
goods. This pattern of protection increases the returns to value-adding  factors in the final
goods industries.  Even quite moderate  tariffs on final goods can lead to sharp increases in
the returns to value added in a particular sector if intermediate inputs are a large share of
total costs. Imports of most basic industrial raw materials are relatively free of import
restrictions since Vietnam does not yet have significant  upstream steel or plastics
industries (Flatters, 1998a). For many goods that are not produced in Vietnam, the tariff
rates are virtually zero. This confers a great advantage  on domestic users of these
products.
An indication of the total impact of protection can be obtained using the
Effective Rate of Protection (ERP). The ERP differs from the NRP by taking into account
the trade barriers that are imposed on the intermediate  inputs used in the production of
goods. 6 Protection granted to final goods increases returns to value adding factors in a
6The effective rate of protection (ERP) is defined as the percentage change in producers' value-added, as a
result of taxes on trade, over the level of value-added that would have prevailed in the absence of those
taxes. For import substituting industries, the formula for calculating the ERP is
ERPm = (VAmj -VAj*YVAj*
where VA  mj  is industry  j's  value added at domestic prices and VAj*  is value added at world prices. VAmj  and
VAj*  are computed as
VAmj  = VOj- X  INTij
VAj*  = VO/(1 +  tj) - I  INTj/(1+t,)
where VOj  is the value of output of industry  j,  INTij is the use of intermediate input i by industry  j,  and tj is
the nominal tariff rate imposed on industry  j. The ERP for export production can be
ERP.=(VA.j  - VAj*/VAj*
where
VA.j =VOj/(l  + tj) - EINTij
VAj* = VO/(l  + tj) - X  INT/(l  +t,)
21sector. By contrast, taxes on intermediate  inputs reduce the returns to value adding
factors. Protection has different implications for import substituting and export oriented
activities. Higher protection on outputs raises the domestic prices for import competing
goods and increases the returns involved in producing them. Exporting activities have to
face world prices for their sales and so do not benefit from protection on their output.
They can only be harmed by protection to other sectors. The ERP measures provided in
this section capture the direct adverse impacts of protection on these firms. There is an
additional adverse impact that arises from the increases in the prices of nontraded
goods-the  real exchange rate appreciation effect of protection.
Table 6.  The Structure of Vietnam's Protection
Nominal Protection of  Effective Rate of Protection (ERP)
Import Tariff
GTAP  Description  Simple  Weighted  ERP  for Import  ERPfor
Average  Average  Substitution  Export Production
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
1  Paddy rice  5.0  5.0  4.2  -3.8
2  Wheat  3.0  3.0  3.0  0.0
3  Cereal grains  5.9  2.6  -4.6  -10.0
4  Vegetables, fruits, nuts  24.3  27.2  41.6  -8.1
5  Oil seeds  8.6  6.5  4.4  -7.1
6  Sugar cane, sugar beet  10.0  10.0  9.7  -3.8
7  Plant-based  fibers  3.9  4.2  1.3  -6.0
8  Crops n.e.c.  13.2  6.2  4.5  -5.8
9  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses  4.5  4.8  0.9  -7.1
10  Animal products n.e.c.  5.0  3.7  -1.5  -7.4
12  Wool, silk-worm cocoons  3.0  1.3  -2.2  -4.2
13  Forestry  4.0  1.2  -20.5  -22.9
14  Fishing  16.9  18.9  66.6  -45.7
15  Coal  3.8  3.4  -14.4  -22.2
16  Oil  4.5  1.0  _-13.9  -15.9
17  Gas  14.1  15.5  24.5  -13.3
18  Minerals  n.e.c.  2.3  1.1  =  -21.4  -27.0
19  Bovine cattle, sheep,goat  12.2  10.3  12.2  -3.5
meat
20  Meat products n.e.c.  18.1  27.3  43.3  -5.4
21  Vegetable oils and fats  13.1  12.3  1.4  -98.5
22  Dairy products  16.7  14.5  16.3  -5.7
23  Processed rice  7.5  7.5  8.0  -22.5
24  Sugar  30.0  30.0  naa  na"
25  Food products n.e.c.  28.6  20.1  59.6  -48.3
26  Beverage and tobacco  52.1  50.2  Naa  naa
Value added at domestic prices for export production (VA,j) differs from that for import substitution (VAmj)
since exporters face world prices for their sales.
22Nominal Protection of  Effective Rate of Protection (ERP)
Import Tariff
GTAP  Description  Simple  Weighted  ERPfor Import  ERPfor
Average  Average  Substitution  Export Production
products
27  Textiles  29.4  30.0  =  115.0  -138.0
28  Wearing apparel  49.2  49.4  1229.8  -231.9
29  Leather  products  18.8  13.5  _  -15.1  -67.1
30  Wood products  18.7  11.9  _  15.2  -19.3
31  Paper products, publishing  20.0  19.4  _  88.1  -88.5
32  Petroleum,  coal products  9.6  44.0  naa  nae
33  Chemical, rubber, plastic,  8.8  6.4  -0.1  -40.3
products
34  Mineral products n.e.c.  20.7  23.8  169.6  -52.3
35  Ferrous metals  5.3  6.0  3.7  -25.3
36  Metals n.e.c.  5.8  10.4  121.9  -103.8
37  Metal products  18.5  16.6  34.5  -33.9
38  Motor vehicles and parts  22.6  18.6  186.4  -200.7
39  Transport  equipment n.e.c.  13.2  28.3  56.6  -32.9
40  Electronic  equipment  9.7  10.7  13.8  -18.4
41  Machinery and equipment  7.4  8.1  -0.6  -29.3
n.e.c.
42  Manufactures  n.e.c.  24.7  22.7  1_  64.3  -45.1
Total  15.6  19.0  _
°ERP has not been defined since value added at world prices was negative.
Sources: Centre for Intemational Economics, Vietnam's Tariff Schedule  (I 998a); GTAP4 database
The ERPs for Vietnamese industries have been calculated using input-output table
information  from the GTAP Version 4 database. Table 6 reveals very high effective rates
of assistance for import substitution activities in industries such as apparel, motor
vehicles and parts, and textiles. These distortions provide strong incentives for firms to
engage in production only for the domestic market, and to draw resources away from
firms able to compete on world markets.
The fourth column of Table 6 shows the effective rate of protection applying to a
firm that produces for the export market, but is unable to benefit from exemptions of
import duties on imported inputs. As expected, the effect of the tariff regime on such a
firm is invariably negative, because the cost-increasing  effects of higher prices for
intermediate goods are not offset by benefits on output prices 7. It is worth noting that the
7 Negative effective rates of protection may clearly exceed 100 percent, but production for export is
unlikely to take place in this situation.
23negative effects for exporters are the largest for such industries as apparel and motor
vehicles where the prices of intermediate inputs, as well as outputs, are raised by
protection. This is at least partly because the government tends to use tariff and other
protective measures on intermediate goods to achieve localization objectives (see Box
1).8
Two cautions should be borne in mind in interpreting these protection figures.
First, these figures do not include the protective effects of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs). A
set of important industries, including cement, steel, sugar and paper industries, is
protected by quantitative restrictions rather than tariffs. Second, the ERP for export
production does not include the firms who benefit from the duty-draw back system.
Non Tariff Measures (NTMs)
A complex set of non-tariff measures remains in Vietnam. Quantitative
restrictions are used to "regulate supply and demand" and to protect the domestic
production of "potential" and "infant" industries (WTO, 1998). The regulations on import
quota and the list of prohibited imports/exports appear to change from time to time,
creating considerable uncertainty for traders. Products subject to import licensing
restrictions fall into three main groups: goods subject to import licensing and quotas
under Decree 57 and Decision 254; goods subject to specialized management by line
ministries; and goods banned from imports. These import licensing restrictions currently
cover approximately 40 percent of imports (World Bank, 1999b). Ten types of imports
are subject to licensing under Decree 57, including petroleum and oil, fertilizer, motor
cycles, cars of 15 seats or less, steel and iron, cement, sugar, paper, alcohol, and
construction glass. Imports of some of these products are occasionally banned (IMF,
1999b).
8 For production and assembly of electronic appliances, the localization  ratio is at least 20 percent for the
first 2 years and must be increased annually; for production and assembly of automobiles, the required
localization  ratio is 5 percent after the first 5 years and must be increased to reach 30 percent after the first
10 years; for motorcycles and spare parts, the required localization  ratio is 5-1O  percent after the first 2
years and must be increased to 60 percent after the first 5 years (WTO, 1998).
24Formal access to foreign exchange is still subject to considerable restrictions,
although the multiple exchange rate regime that prevailed prior to 1989 has been unified.
Foreign invested entities are generally responsible for balancing their own foreign
exchange requirements.  Only entities involved in projects producing specific import
substitutes,  specified infrastructure  projects and designated important projects are
guaranteed conversion  of local currency.
Trade Reform  in the Lao PDR
The adoption of the New Economic  Mechanism (NEM) in 1986 signaled a
significant shift of the Lao PDR' s economy from a centrally planned system to a market
system. Since then, public enterprises have been given operating autonomy, and the
private sector has been authorized  to participate in economic  activities. In 1987, the Lao
PDR abolished the practice of "cost plus" pricing for state enterprises in favor of market-
determined prices. In 1988, the Lao PDR abandoned the multiple exchange rate system
and moved to a single rate close to that previously  prevailing in the parallel market.
Trade liberalization has been one of the pillars of the economic reforms; under the
NEM, the state monopoly on trade in most goods has been eliminated, tariff rates have
been lowered and quantitative restrictions and specific licensing requirements have been
reduced. In the meantime, the end of the Cold War eased the political tension between the
Lao PDR and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and
other former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries led to a
substantial shift in the Lao PDR's direction  of trade from the nonconvertible to the
convertible  currency area and especially towards the ASEAN countries. Throughout the
period, the approach of the Lao PDR's economic reforms has been "gradual" rather than
"big bang." However, the Lao PDR's reform efforts have slowed or even reversed in
some areas in the recent years, especially after the regional financial crisis.
25Protection on Imports
Table 7 shows the Lao PDR's statutory tariff structure. The current tariff rates range
from 5 percent to 40 percent with 6 tariff bands (5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40).
Table 7. The Lao PDR's Statutory Tarff Rates
Tariff Rates  TariffLine  Share(%)
5  1820  51.3
10  1151  32.4
15  7  0.2
20  246  6.9
30  201  5.7
40  123  3.5
Prohibited  3  0.1
Total  3551  100
Source: Customs Departnent, Vientiane
Overall, the Lao PDR's tariff rates imply a relatively low level of protection for a
low income country, with a simple average of 9.6 percent and a weighted average of 14.7
percent. Effective May 10, 1997, the tariff rates for some "luxury" commodities which
had been above 40 percent, 9 were reduced down to a maximum 40 percent with the duties
above 40 percent being replaced by excise taxes (Government  of the Lao PDR, May,
1997). Tariffs subject to the reform included 41 tariff lines covering motor vehicles,
motorcycles,  beer, tobacco, and household appliances.
Table 8 shows the differences in the tariff rates weighted by the Lao PDR's
imports sourced from ASEAN and the rest of the world. While the tariff rates are the
same at the tariff-line level, the weighted averages differ because of differences in the
mix of imports in each group. Average tariffs differ slightly between ASEAN and the rest
of the world, with duties on imports from ASEAN averaging 15.2 percent as against 13.4
percent from the rest of the world. The weighted average tariff rates for animal and
animal products, vegetable  products and processedfoods, drinks & tobacco are
9 Before the reform, the higher rates were applied to cigarettes (60 percent), beer (80 percent), and vehicles
(up to 150 percent.)
26considerably higher for imports from the rest of the world. Conversely, ASEAN partners
face a substantially  higher tariff than the rest of the world for transport equipment.
Table 8 Statutory MFN tariff rates applying to imports  from ASEAN  and ROW
Description  Total  ASEAN  ROW
Animals & animal products  7.1  6.8  17.6
Vegetable  products  13.0  9.5  19.4
Animal & Vegetable oils  10.1  10.1  10.0
Processed foods, drinks & tobacco  30.7  29.1  37.6
Oil and minerals products  5.0  5.0  5.9
Chemical products  10.5  11.2  8.3
Plastic & rubber products  12.1  12.2  11.2
Skins & furs and their products  13.7  13.5  14.1
Wood & wood products  31.0  31.1  29.6
Pulp of wood & paper  8.8  9.0  7.1
Textiles  9.5  9.5  9.9
Apparel  10.3  10.2  10.9
Shoes, hats, umbrellas, etc.  10.1  10.1  10.1
Stone, ceramic & glass products  5.2  5.1  6.8
Jewelry & precious metal products  5.0  5.0  5.0
Base metals & their products  5.9  6.0  5.3
Electrical & mechanical  equipment  7.7  8.8  5.9
Transport equipment  26.9  32.7  17.9
Photographic,  optical, precision instruments  6.0  6.4  5.6
Arms & munitions  30.0  n.a.  30.0
Miscellaneous  articles  13.2  13.9  11.4
Objets d'art  5.0  5.0  5.0
Total  14.7  _  15.2  13.4
Statutory tariff rates, however, are not indicative of actual tariff collections since
there are exemptions to the tariffs. The special privileges granted for foreign firms are the
most important source of tariff exemptions. Foreign investors are required to pay import
duties for the importation of production equipment and facilities, spare parts and other
equipment used in the project or business operations at the rate of 1 percent of the
imported value. Raw materials and intermediate  components imported for export
processing are exempt from import duties. Raw materials and intermediate components
imported for the purpose of achieving  import substitution are also eligible for special
duty reductions. In addition, some companies can obtain a "convention" that clears them
27to import or export specified products free of all taxes (Finger and Castro, 1997).  Ad hoc
tariff exemptions are often granted, principally for imports by state enterprises. The use
of appreciated exchange rates for customs valuation purposes has been another source of
shortfalls in import duty collections. In 1998/99, a rate of 4,000 kip per dollar was used
for import valuation while the commercial bank rate averaged 6,345 kip per dollar.
In the Lao PDR, non-tariff barriers are less transparent and more difficult to
quantify than in many other countries. While many of these barriers are not atypical in
developing countries, some appear influenced by the form of the trade regime under the
planning system. The Prime Minister's Order 06/PM of March 1999 reduced the number
of licensed trading companies by forming six trading groups. Each importer is licensed to
import no more than the allocated quantity and inidividual  shipments need to be licensed
by the Ministry of Commerce and Transport (IMF, 1999a). Quotas apply to the
importation of fuel and lubricants, steel bars for construction, all types of cement, and all
types of motor vehicles and motor cycles. The authorities continue to use administrative
measures to allocate foreign exchange. Traders also report that customs clearance
procedures are slow, and that the licensing system is inefficient.
The transportation oligopoly that governs transit trade through Thailand remains a
serious non-tariff barrier on Lao PDR exports. According to Finger and Castro (1997), T-
L Enterprise had a monopoly of transit shipments across Thailand to and from the Lao
PDR until 1994, and remains the only agent authorized to officially process shipments
into and out of the Lao PDR through Thailand. The transport markup is reported to be at
least 20 percent, making the cost of shipment from the Lao PDR to Bangkok as large as
the cost from Bangkok to Europe. These high transit costs place strong downward
pressure on returns to labor and capital, which are already disadvantaged by relatively
high transport costs. For the economy as a whole, the excess transportation cost is worse
than a tariff because much of the excess cost likely accrues to foreigners.
28Trade Reform in Cambodia
Since the formation of the Royal Government  in 1993, the reform of Cambodia's
trade regime from a centrally controlled system into a relatively open system has been
impressive.  The government's objectives  have aimed to foster Cambodia's integration
into the world economy. Key steps were taken very rapidly, particularly during the
transition and early phases of the establishment  of the Royal Government. Important
early reforms included the unification of exchange rates, tariff reform, the abolition of
many nontariff barriers, and the implementation  of a liberal Law on Investment. Perhaps
because of the difficulties faced by the new government, in the context of ongoing
rebellion by the Khmer Rouge, the transition was much more abrupt than in China,
Vietnam or the Lao PDR.
Trade reform involves particularly important transition issues for Cambodia given
its current heavy reliance on tariff revenues.  In 1998, trade tax revenues represented 56
percent of Cambodia's total tax revenues.  This dependence  constrains the scope for trade
reform, and makes complementary  tax reforms a key priority. A high proportion of tariff
revenues is earned on a small number of high-tariff products such as petroleum and
cigarettes. Converting these tariffs to excise duties would allow more revenue to be raised
for any given rates in those cases where domestic production  exists, and remove the
artificial incentives for import-substituting  local production. As can be seen from Table
9, Cambodia's tariff regime has reasonably low tariffs on average, although there is
considerable  variation between products.
An important feature of Cambodia's transition strategy is a very liberal
investment regime designed to attract foreign investment.  This regime includes liberal
exemptions on investment goods and inputs used in the production of exports, as well as
income tax concessions (Martin 1996). It has certainly been successful in attracting
investment in areas such as clothing,
29Table 9  MFN  Tad f Rates  for  Cambodia
Description  Simple  Weighted Average(%)
Average(%)
Animals  & animal  products  25.4  15.9
Vegetable  products  13.2  9.0
Animal  & Vegetable  oils  7.6  7.0
Processed  foods,  drinks  & tobacco  25.8  15.4
Oil and minerals  products  14.0  23.9
Chemical  products  11.2  5.3
Plastic  & rubber  products  10.7  10.7
Skins  & furs  and their products  29.8  31.7
Wood  & wood  products  31.7  33.1
Pulp  of wood  & paper  7.0  7.0
Textiles  19.4  20.1
Apparel  27.9  20.1
Shoes,  hats, umbrellas,  etc.  27.4  29.4
Stone,  ceramic  & glass  products  12.5  8.1
Jewelry  & precious  metal  products  35.9  0.4
Base  metals  & their  products  14.5  9.0
Electrical  & mechanical  equipment  17.0  15.1
Transport  equipment  29.3  24.2
Photographic,  optical,  precision  instruments  13.0  10.8
Arms  & munitions  40.0  38.0
Miscellaneous  articles  17.9  13.7
Objets  d'art  n.a.  n.a.
Average  16.6  17.3
In Cambodia, as in Vietnam and Lao PDR, the stimulus for a great deal of recent
modernization of trade procedures and for preferential liberalization of trade barriers has
been accession to the ASEAN Free Trade Area. In the next section, we turn to the use
that transition economies can make of regional and global trade arrangements in their
reform efforts.
The Role of Regional and Multilateral Trade  Agreements
While the advantages of an open trade regime are widely recognized by policy
makers, it remains difficult to build political support for such a regime in the face of
pressures from vested interests. Participation in regional arrangements may help to build
support for liberalization (World Bank 2000). Such participation may also be very useful
30in obtaining the policy credibility that is needed to attract long term, irreversible
investments in export production, or other activities that require a consistent policy
regime.
It appears that accession to the ASEAN Free Trade Area has been a useful initial
step for the new ASEAN members of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (Martin
and Fukase 2000). Meeting the requirements  of accession has helped countries
modernize their procedures, and required them to make sweeping liberalization
commitments on most of their imports. Some of the exceptions allowed under the original
liberalization commitments have been excessive, but there appears to be a strong policy
dynamic within ASEAN that reduces these exceptions over time.
It is important that participation  in regional arrangements  continue to be seen as a
stepping stone, rather than a stumbling block, on the path to a more open trade regime.
The big problem with regional trade liberalization is that it introduces costly trade
diversion in addition to the healthy trade creation that is its most immediately apparent
effect. This problem of trade diversion is particularly serious if the external trade barriers
in the bloc are high. Even in ASEAN where, as we have seen, external trade barriers are
relatively low, the welfare gains from trade creation are, in most cases, almost completely
wiped out by the losses from trade diversion  for the new members of ASEAN (Fukase
and Martin 2000).
Accession to the WTO is one approach to further deepening reforms. WTO
members now require quite stringent liberalization commitments  from new WTO
members. New members are, for instance, likely to be required to bring average tariffs to
10 percent or less, and to enter into a very wide range of commitments, both on trade in
goods and in a wide range of other areas including the protection of intellectual property,
and trade in services. Since crucial rules, and particularly the reliance on price-based
measures of protection, are critically dependent on a market-oriented  economic system,
accession is likely to impose strong constraints on state activity in the economy. A
particularly important commitment on trade in goods is the phase-out of quantitative
31trade measures. While these commitments may be politically difficult, such
nondiscriminatory  liberalization commitments will almost always generate much larger
gains than those available from regional arrangements  (See Fukase and Martin 2000 for
examples from ASEAN; Ianchovichina, Martin and Fukase 2000 for examples from
China).
WTO membership has a powerful mechanism for increasing the credibility of
commitments to a generally open trade regime. Once tariffs are bound at a low level, it is
difficult for them to be increased, a constraint that can be very helpful in maintaining an
open trade regime in the face of pressures from special interests within the country for
increases in the tariffs of particular interest to them.
WTO membership also provides governments with important protection from
larger trading partners (Michalopoulos 1998).  Of particular interest to East Asian
exporters is the obligation under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
to phase out quotas on textiles and clothing by 2005. It also provides protection against
unilateral pressures to meet unilaterally-declared  and enforced standards on products or
processes. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism  has proved very useful in protecting
the interests of small trading countries.
The accession process can be long and difficult, although countries that are
prepared to meet the high standards required by members of the Working Parties on
Accession can accede relatively quickly, as has been demonstrated  by the rapid increase
in the membership of WTO in recent years. The East Asian transition economies whose
average tariffs are in the 10-20 percent range are in striking distance of the tariff rates
they are likely to need for WTO accession-although  substantial further changes are
likely to be required.
32Conclusions
The performance of the East Asian transition economies during the 1990s  has
clearly been remarkable relative to that of the transition economies of Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union. The East Asian economies have been able to achieve
remarkably  high rates of growth in both exports and output during this period, without
the frequently large declines in output and exports observed in Europe and the FSU.
The transition process from a planned economy to an open, market-oriented
economy requires a large number of inter-related  changes. Domestic reforms are needed
to define property rights, to make enterprises competitive,  and to ensure that they respond
to price incentives. In the trade policy sphere, inter-related  reforms are needed to: open
up the trade system to competing  traders; to develop indirect policy instruments such as
tariffs; and to remove exchange rate distortions.  While these reforms are difficult, each of
the East Asian transition economies with a sustained  commitment to reform'l has
managed to make these reforms in its own way, and to great effect during the 1990s.
The trade regimes in all of these countries have a considerable  distance to go,
not only in terms of reducing barriers, but also in terms of developing systems that will
facilitate trade flows and create a more predictable and sustainable investment climate.
However, many of the most difficult steps have been taken in terms of developing
domestic institutions, and modernizing  the trade regime. Most of the problems that
remain in these countries are similar to those faced by other, non-transition, economies.
The experience of the East Asian transition economies should provide a great deal of
reassurance both to policy makers in other countries contemplating  entering the reform
path, and to policy makers in the transition economies themselves.
1°  Clearly, this group includes China, Cambodia,  Lao PDR, and Vietnam
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